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JUSTIFICATION, RESEARCH PRECURSORS 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the geopolitical environment has altered so 
radically the political scientist is justified in asking: what exactly does “national 
security” mean today and what are the new threats nation-states face? We know 
that the threat of a politically driven WWIII-type conflict is no longer the 
driving issue. For several years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the 
practitioners of national security suffered a malaise of competing and often less 
than fully credible theories being foisted upon them by the academic world. 
Whilst some of these attempts to explain the post-Cold War system made their 
authors very rich and famous1, none of them enjoyed unequivocal and 
unanimous recognition on a scale comparable to the universally accepted 
description of the previous four decades as a bipolar system of competing 
ideological blocs. There is one important reason for this: there was no 
overarching threat as there had been under the Cold War. That is not to say that 
there was an absence of threats to national security. There were many such 
perceived challenges. 
 
                                                          
1 The most influential attempts to make the world more understandable after the loss of the ‘Red 
Menace’ were Francis Fukuyama’s concept of ‘The End of History’, which posited the glorious 
victory of “market-democracy” over all and Samuel P. Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ 
argument that future conflict would be religiously or culturally defined. See Francis Fukuyama: 
“The End of History”, The National Interest, Summer 1989 and Samuel Huntington: “The Clash of 
Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, vol.72, no.3, or the two books that grew from each 
essay. 
   For the sake of accuracy it should be noted, however, that the modern, post Cold War theory of 
civilisational clash did not begin with Huntington. It was first internationally coined by the leading 
western scholar of matters Muslim, Bernard Lewis. A controversial figure, who will be discussed 
later in this study, Lewis wrote at length on the concept in a piece entitled “Roots of Muslim Rage” 
in the September 1990 issue of the Atlantic Monthly. The article was reprinted in the Summer 
2001-2002 issue of Policy and can be accessed at http://www.cis.org.au/policy/summer01-
02/polsumm01-3.pdf. (All footnoted internet references are correct as of September 2007) 
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The problem with the list of threats (from ethnic-cleaning to the proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction - WMD) was firstly its length in comparison to 
the far simpler and coherent threat perception and mission statement of the Cold 
War environment, and secondly, that until recently (11th September 2001) there 
was heated debate as to how one should prioritise its elements. What should 
nations focus their attention on more, ethnic cleansing or organised crime, 
WMD or environmental catastrophe? There was no clear sense of whether one 
threat was more overarching than all the others.  
 
Since September 11th 2001, however, there seems to have been a change in 
threat perceptions, at least from the point of view of the United States, NATO’s 
leading member and the only post-Cold War superpower. After the coordinated 
attacks that left almost 3,000 innocents dead, this most influential of nations has 
decided that the geostrategic environment has a new order to it, that a new form 
of globalised, “hyper-terrorism”2 fuelled by Islamic extremism is the new 
overarching threat to the security of the western world, and that from now on a 
country must be judged as good or evil based solely on its stance with regard to 
the new “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT). September 11th was said by 
many to provide the clarity with which the new geostrategic environment can 
be described and understood. To quote Charles Krauthammer, transnational 
terrorist groups3 such as al Qaeda are now the overarching concern of national 
security and pose “an existential threat”4 to the United States and its allies5.  
                                                          
2 A term first coined by the French security analyst François Heisbourg. The term Hyper-terrorism 
is meant to communicate the assessment that groups such as Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda are 
radically more capable and therefore more of a threat to democratic governments than previous 
“more classic” terrorist groups, that they are interested in mass casualty attacks. See Heisbourg's 
influential yet rather apocalyptic work: La fin de l'Occident? L'Amérique, l'Europe et le Moyen-
Orient, [The End of the West? America, Europe, and the Middle East], Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005 
and Sebestyén L. v. Gorka: “Hyper-Terrorism”: the Globalisation of Terror” JANES Terrorism 
and Security Monitor, Special Report, JANES, April 2003. 
3 Unfortunately the adjectives most often used to pin-point the existential threat so cited are 
Muslim, Islamic or Islamist terrorism, with Global Jihadism becoming more and more popular as 
well. All of these descriptions do a great disservice to law-abiding Muslims everywhere and also 
add an undeserved sense of quasi religious legitimacy to murderous terrorists that have little in 
  6 
 
HYPOTHESIS AND METHODS APPLIED 
 
The primary supposition of my dissertation is that the United States of 
America’s current threat perception is valid. It is not my purpose here to judge 
the veracity of this assessment, whether or not hyper-terrorism is or is not the 
most important post-Cold War threat. Central to this paper is the question of 
what exactly is this new threat and how new is it really. In order to answer these 
questions it is first necessary to grasp the key term and to come to terms with it. 
The word terrorism seems so familiar. We see it every day in the news, during 
discussions, but do we really know what it means? 
 
The first fundamental problem with any study of the phenomenon of terrorism 
is the inadequacy of the label and the lack of a long-established school of study 
of terrorism. To begin with it must be recognised that the word terrorism is in 
no way a value-free and scientifically discrete term. When used is bears with it 
a subjective loading which means that the person who calls someone else a 
terrorist is making a moral judgement, not just a description. Secondly, as a 
field of scientific study, research into terrorism has been an orphan child for too 
long. Surprisingly the systematic study of the phenomenon did not begin in 
earnest until approximately 35 years ago. Only recently has the field been truly 
adopted and made a sub-set of political science. In doing so it was recognised 
that the term terrorism was not scientific enough, or neutral enough and 
therefore today we speak rather of the study of political violence.  
                                                                                                                                
common with the teachings of the Koran or Mohammed. As a result I will shy away from using 
such popular yet inflammatory phrases and will employ what I believe to more accurate labels, 
such as transcendentally informed terrorists. 
4 See the various pieces by Krauthammer in the National Interest, such as:  “Neoconservatism and 
Foreign Policy”, The National Interest, Fall 2004. Excerpt available at 
www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/October2004/October2004Krauthammer.html. 
5 For statistics on the increased lethality of terrorist attacks in the post-Cold War world see 
Appendix I. 
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But still the question remains, what do political scientists understand today by 
the term political violence, or terrorism? Unfortunately, in part as a result of the 
messy history of the study of the phenomenon and other more political factors, 
today there are a multitude, scores of definitions of what terrorism is and there 
is no universal agreement at all on the subject. 6 
 
This dissertation deals in some detail with the struggle to arrive at a definition 
for terrorism and will provide its own recommendation. At this preliminary 
stage I wish to simply list several characteristics or elements I believe to be 
essential components. Subsequently I am of the opinion that modern terrorism, 
or political violence, must demonstrate some or all of the following elements: 
 
• there must be a political or religious goal or end-state in the minds of the 
group perpetrating a terrorist act 
 
• terrorism must involve the use or the threat of the use of violence 
 
• terrorists do not follow the recognised laws of war 
 
• one can only speak of terrorism if is it is being executed by a minority in 
opposition to a legitimate government, or majority 
 
• the inculcation of fear in a populace is a core element of terrorism. As a result 
the media, electronic and otherwise, is of great use to the terrorist in spreading 
his message of intimidation.7 
 
                                                          
6 For example, the FBI has one definition, so does the PENTAGON, as does the British Criminal 
Code, or the French Criminal Code, just to name a few existing definitions. See Appendix II for 
examples. 
7 Brian Jenkins the leading terrorism expert is famous for stating that the modern terrorist is not 
interested in having as many people as possible die as a result of his acts, but is interested far more 
in having as many people as possible watching his actions (via the media) in order to have his 
message be communicated as wide as possible. Discussions will Dr. Jenkins, Orlando, Florida, 
November 2nd-5th 2005. 
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In studying the phenomenon of political violence for well over a decade now, I 
have come to the conclusion that existing classifications of terrorism are 
inadequate. The variety demonstrated by various groups and actors has led me 
to the conclusion that one must employ a new additional categorisation when 
discussing groups that employ methods of political violence in the post-Cold 
War environment. I have labelled the two sub-divisions of terrorist, the Rational 
and Pragmatic and the Irrational, or Transcendental Terrorist and define them as 
follows: 
 
RATIONAL, PRAGMATIC TERRORIST 
The rational terrorist organisation has as its ultimate goal the realisation of a 
state of affairs that is fundamentally feasible and realistic. As a result there is 
the possibility for a political or diplomatic solution to the root grievance. The 
opposing government can – should it so wish – choose to negotiate with such a 
group. (Examples include the Provisional IRA, ETA and the PLO). 
 
                 IRRATIONAL, TRANSCENDENTAL TERRORIST 
The irrational terrorist has as his end goal the realisation of a state-of-affairs 
that is not obviously feasible or realistic and which is completely antithetic to 
the opposing government. There is no possibility for a political resolution or 
even negotiations. (Example: the Aum Shinrykio destructive cult of Japan that 
executed the poison gas attack on the Tokyo metro in 19958.). 
                                                          
8 The sarin gas attack executed on the Tokyo metro by Aum in 1995 was in fact preceded by 
several unsuccessful biological agent attacks prepared by the private laboratories the cult had 
established with millions of dollars of its funds. For a journalistic account of the history of the cult 
see David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshal: “The Cult at the End of the World”, Arrow Books, 
London, 1996. For a scholarly and detailed analysis see the relevant section in Richard A. 
Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer: “America's Achilles' Heel: nuclear, 
biological, and chemical terrorism and covert attack”, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998. 
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My Hypothesis is fourfold: 
 
1. Irrational terrorist actors have become more 
numerous since the cessation of the Cold War 
 
2. Governments are sorely limited in the selection of 
tools that can be used in the face of such actors 
 
3. The Irrational or Transcendentally informed 
terrorist represents a wholly different category 
of threat, since due to the fact that he is 
completely uninterested in political resolution, 
he can justify the use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.  
 
4. Osama bin Laden typifies the new threat and poses 
a challenge which we cannot adequately deal with 
given existing Westphalian state structures and 
national security divisions of labour. 
 
 
My dissertation validates these hypotheses by demonstrating: 
 
a) How national security has evolved as a function of the modern 
nation-state. 
 
b) What the difference is between the geostrategic environments of 
the Cold War and the post-September 11th 2001 state-of-affairs. 
 
c) Who Osama bin Laden is and how novel an organisation al Qaeda 
is and, 
 
d) What should be done to reform Westphalian security architectures 
so as to make them applicable to the new threat environment that 
has been shaped by the rise of the Irrational/Transcendental Actor 
and the globalisation of security. 
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My conclusion is that the existing hierarchical nation-state structures which 
were created as a by-product of the establishment of the modern nation-state 
must be flattened and made interdepartmental. I call this being “SuperPurple”, a 
phrase I derive from the inter-armed forces integration mandate upon US forces 
under the Goldwater Nichols Act (which was called ‘Purple’ integration).   
 
THE WESTPHALIAN INHERITANCE 
 
My dissertation discusses at some length the national security system that has 
evolved globally in the last 4 centuries. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 is 
taken by most commentators as introducing the foundations for the creation in 
the West of a system in which the objects were states, bodies that were 
independent of each others – although which could ally with one another – and 
into whose internal affairs it was not allowed to become involved, a system in 
which sovereignty would eventually become paramount9. Later, as this concept 
evolved and as the individual allegiances of the people would shift from local 
landowner or royal house, to a professional political elite defined around a 
national identity, the state would evolve further into the nation-state, with is 
fundamental aspects of citizenship and nationality.  
 
For our purposes, the most important side-effect of the founding and 
development of the nation state as a way to run and define a country, are the 
ramifications of this new locus of sovereignty on the practice of providing for 
the security of the new construct. Whilst man has been waging war for as long 
as territory and other forms of exappropriable wealth have existed, the modern 
method of securing the nation state resulted in a new and fascinatingly almost 
universal division of labour being established in practically every nation of the 
                                                          
9 In fact it was the sacrosanct nature of sovereignty that would later lie behind the creation of the 
‘balance-of-power’ system that would be so important to Europe in following centuries. 
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world10. The national security systems thus created were quite simply formed 
around a categorisation of threats as being either external, internal, civilian, or 
military in nature. Of course, there developed particular variants, nations that 
combined civilian and military counter-intelligence into one body, for example, 
but on the whole the majority of modern nations-states established a division of 
labour as described in Table One. 
 
 
Type of Threat 
 
 
Nation State Institutional Response 
 
 
External Military (Invasion) 
 
 
Standing Professional Army 
 
Internal Constitutional, Legal Disorder 
 
 
Police Force 
 
Theft of Military Secrets 
 
 
Military Counter-Intelligence 
 
Theft of Political, Economic Secrets 
 
 
Civilian Counter-Intelligence 
 
Enemy Military Intention/Capability 
 
 
Military Intelligence 
 
Enemy Intention by External Political Elite 
 
 
Civilian Intelligence (Espionage) 
 
         Table One: The Inherited Architecture of Westphalian National Security 
 
It should be remembered, that whilst we take for granted today the existence for 
example, of police forces and professional armies, these are all recent 
inventions in historical terms, with village militias and temporarily hired 
mercenaries having been the rule for centuries before the permanent elements of 
the Westphalian national security structure were fully established. 
                                                          
10 There are of course rare exceptions to the rule, such a countries such as Andorra or Costa Rica, 
but these all have in common either the fact that they are too small to have their own armies or 
security services, or that they rely upon external and comprehensive guarantees of safety, as in the 
case of the latter and its relationship with the USA. 
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In each case, as the nation state evolved and solidified its structures, the internal 
architecture of national security was reinforced by the laws and constitutional 
measures which defined the responsibilities and specific missions of the given 
organs. As a means to preserve efficiency and to ensure against abuses of power 
and information, practically every state of the developed West would severely 
demarcate the spheres of authority of each body. Matters of military 
intelligence, for example, were to be the sole purview of the body (-ies) 
expressly mandated to respond to this threat, and so on. In fact any intentional 
or even inadvertent flouting of this strict division of labour could, if found out, 
generally cause scandal and/or investigation11. The strict interpretation of 
missions and the resultant mirror-image response whereby the threat would be 
matched by a domestic body focused on that threat, would simply be further 
reinforced by the cut and dry, unequivocal threat environment presented by the 
Cold War, within which the threat was posed by a group of nation-states. 
 
I argue that this Westphalian system for the provision of national security – 
whilst very logical and successful in the past – is greatly limited in applicability 
when faced with threats that are not linked to the nation state. One such threat is 
transnational terrorism. But before I can examine exactly how limited the 
system is, I must further refine my definition of terrorism.  
 
Having established core definitional elements and avoiding semantic traps, (see 
Appendix II for official definitions) we arrive at a workable definition, such 
that: 
                                                          
11  For example when the CIA was accused during the Vietnam War of collecting information on 
Americans nationals in the USA, an activity which was outside of its mandate. 
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TERRORISM is the use of violence (or threat thereof) to 
inculcate fear so as to pressure the broader population - 
or its legitimate representatives - into a political or 
religious end-state that is not of their choosing. 
 
There are, of course, many other additional ways to approach the question of a 
workable definition of terrorism. One more avenue that takes us out of the 
abstraction of mere words is a pictographic representation of the mechanics of 
terrorism. By resorting to a Venn diagram-like approach, it may be easier to 
understand the dynamics at work between the various subjects and objects of 
political violence: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actor     
(A) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
         TARGET OF 
          VIOLENCE / VICTIM 
                (B) 
 
 
Diagram One: The Mechanics of Terrorism 
 
Here the mechanics of terror are more transparent. Terrorist group A wishes to 
induce an effect upon a target audience, C, primarily the political elite of the 
nation which is not acting in accordance with its own desires. To coerce change, 
fear is employed either directly onto members of this elite (this would be 
Terrorist 
Group  
Resultant 
Fear » 
Political 
Pressure
The 
Attack 
Society 
to inc. Political  
Elite, General 
Public and Inter-
national Opinion
TARGET OF TERROR  
(C) Terror 
Attack  
Victim 
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assassination) or pressure is exerted upon this groups through the induction of 
fear in the general public of the nation concerned, or through the reaction of 
international opinion. This fear is induced through the act of attacking a given 
target, B, thus channelling the message to the indirect, yet ultimate target, C. 
The intermediate target of violence can be a member or members of the public, 
or the government, or its authorities. Alex Schmid, formerly of the UN, puts it 
in a far more graphic fashion: “The particular effect of the terrorist message 
results from the fact that it is written, as it were, with the blood of people who 
matter to the addressee, but not to the sender.”12 R. D. Crelinsten likewise talks 
of the “double victimisation method”, wherein there are targets of violence and 
targets of demands, through which the allegiances of the targets of terror and 
targets of attention and the targets of attention and the terrorists themselves13. 
Or there is Jenkins who sees Terrorism as “violence aimed at the people 
watching”, i.e., not the people directly under attack14. 
 
Yet, as I point out in my dissertation, the post-Cold War world redefined 
terrorism in a way that emphasised a resurgence in religiously motivated 
violence, or the “transcendentally informed” terrorist. This (re-)evolution is 
examined in the light of work by leading terrorism scholar David Rapoport and 
his theory of wave-based progression. Below you will see my attempt to put the 
most recent of his observations in the form of a table depicting the four periods 
or waves Rapoport has examined15.  
                                                          
12 A. Schmid: “Political Terrorism” ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 B. Jenkins: “International Terrorism”, ibid.  
15 D. C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism”, op. cit.. 
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 Trigger(s) Targets Methods End-State16 
Anarchist 
1880s-1890s 
(Russia, 
Balkans, Italy 
Unsatisfactory 
governmental 
reform efforts 
The guilt-
inducing, 
stultifying 
national order 
Assassination, 
typically with a 
Bomb and ideally 
via martyrdom 
 
Revolution 
 
 
 
Anti-Colonial 
1920s-1960s 
(Ireland, Israel, 
Cyprus, and 
Algeria) 
 
 
 
 
 
World War I  
(reinforced by 
WWII) 
 
 
 
 
Imperial Order
Bomb and Gun, but 
often also guerrilla-
type ‘hit and run’ 
against police and 
armed forces. 
Diaspora and 
ideologically similar 
nation-states 
provided support, 
USSR included. 
Anti-colonial 
attitude of UN a 
factor 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-
Determination 
(secular state) 
 
New Left 
1960-1980s 
(Palestine, 
Northern 
Ireland, 
Germany, Italy, 
France, Spain, 
Turkey and 
Japan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Vietnam 
War 
 
 
 
 
The 
Undemocratic, 
Political and 
Economic 
Elite 
“Theatrical” targets. 
Hijacking, hostage-
taking, embassy 
attacks and 
assassinations. 
USSR, Cuba, and 
mutual assistance 
arrangements of 
logistical import. 
American interests 
become the preferred 
target  
 
 
Self-
Determination 
 (secular state) 
              
         or  
 
Radicalist, 
Marxist 
 (or both)  
The    
Religious 
Wave 
1979- 2025(?) 
(Israel, 
Palestine, 
Lebanon, 
Egypt, Algeria 
India, 
Philippines, 
Indonesia and 
Japan) 
 
Start of new 
Islamic 
century17 
 
Iranian 
Revolution 
 
Soviet 
Invasion of 
Afghanistan 
 
The Secular 
National  
Political Elites 
 
 
and 
 
 
The USA 
 
 
 
 
 
Suicide-bombing 
 
 
 
 
Creation of a 
Theocratic  
State, or proto- 
Caliphate 
Table Two: The Waves of Modern Terrorism according to Rapoport,  
(author’s own tabular representation) 
 
                                                          
16 Whilst on the surface one can identify different self-professed goals for the terrorists in each 
phase or wave, it is worthy noting something Rapoport himself states before he discusses each 
period individually: ““Revolution” is the overriding aim in every wave, but revolution is 
understood in different ways.” See “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism”, ibid.  
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Yet I am not satisfied with how Rapoport combines in his last wave actors that 
are religiously motivation, such as Osama bin Laden with others whose motives 
are predominantly – if not solely – political (such as Yasser Arafat) 
subsequently I propose a Fifth Wave – the Transcendental - Apocalyptic: 
 
 Triggers Targets Method End-State 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transcendental – 
Apocalyptic  
Terror 
1995-  
(USA, Japan East 
Africa, Thailand, 
UK) 
 
 
Mujahed 
Victory over 
the 
Superpower 
USSR 
 
End of the 
Cold War 
 
The Gulf War 
(and bin 
Laden’s 
rejection by 
the Saudi 
government) 
 
Creation of 
Muslim 
successor 
states to the 
USSR in 
Central Asia 
 
Plight of 
Muslims in 
Bosnia, 
Chechnya and 
Kosovo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apostate 
Arab / 
Muslim 
Leaders 
 
The USA  
 
‘The West’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mass Casualty 
Means, 
Synchronised 
(Suicide) 
Bombers  
(al Q) 
 
BioChem 
Weapons  
(Aum) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global 
Caliphate / 
Theocracy 
(al Q) 
 
 
Global Cult 
Empire (Aum) 
 
 
Table Three: A Fifth Phase in Modern Terrorism: The Transcendental  
 
If the above description is correct, if al Qaeda (and Aum Shinrykio) can be 
considered to be significantly different from the terrorist groups that proceeded 
them, as I believe this to be the case, then, one can reasonably conclude that the 
utility of the methods used to combat the previous four types of terrorist groups 
                                                                                                                                
17 1979 was the year the Muslim calendar moved into1400 Hijra. 
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is not assured and as such we must reassess tools and policies. This question’s 
analysis is the goal of the final chapter of my dissertation.  
 
 
RESULTS :   MANAGING THE DISJUNCTION – ‘SUPERPURPLE’ 
 
I have used my dissertation to demonstrate that today, for many countries, the 
classic tools of national security are ill-suited to the challenge of defending 
against transcendentally-informed users of political violence, such as al Qaeda, 
since al Qaeda and their related threats are not limited by the strictures of the 
Westphalian system, being globally dispersed, interdisciplinary and hyper-
mobile. The urgency for developing new methodologies and frameworks in 
which to understand and deal with such threats is underlined by the fact that the 
transcendental actor – since he is not motivated by worldly, political goals and 
wishes to totally destroy his opponent – can justify within his own ‘logic’ the 
use of weapons of mass destruction. This is “hyper-terrorism”, the intersection 
of WMD means and the use of political violence.  
 
Additionally I demonstrate in my dissertation that national legal order is 
insufficient when addressing crimes that are of such a magnitude that they do 
harm to humankind en masse, in other words, crimes against humanity. The 
systematic targeting for extermination by a government of a particular group for 
reasons of political, ethnic or religious identity is the most obvious such crime 
against humanity. Such arguments lie in part behind legal actions brought in 
Nuremberg against the architects of Adolf Hitler’s “Final Solution” and the 
Hague Tribunal that is currently prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic, amongst 
other, in connection with the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia Muslims and ethnic 
Albanian Kosovars. But more important than the resultant creation of temporary 
supranational courts to try such mass-murderers, is the implicit inference that 
response to such crimes is not simply the responsibly of the legal system of the 
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country where the atrocities occurred, or the legal system of the nationals who 
committed them, but is the responsibility of all nations which have the 
capability and opportunity to take action. The inference being toward universal 
jurisdiction over the perpetrators of such crimes.  With 9/11 one can make the 
case that terrorism has been elevated (or has sunken) to just such as level of 
crime.  
 
With the first unsuccessful attack against the World Trade Center (WTC) in 
199318, Aum’s Sarin gas attack of the Tokyo Metro in 1995, Timothy McVeigh 
massive truck bomb attack in Oklahoma City, the East Africa Embassy 
bombings of 1998, September 11th and the synchronized Madrid railways 
bombings, it is easy to demonstrate the we have moved from the age of mass-
audience (Brian Jenkins) to the age of mass-casualty terrorism and the rise of 
the transcendentally informed (irrational) terrorist. If then the aim of actors 
such as those responsible for the aforementioned attacks is to kill as many 
people as possible, carnage for the sake of carnage, then one can argue that the 
mass-casualty terrorism of groups such as al Qaeda is akin to a crime against all 
humanity that universal jurisdiction applies to such crimes and such actors. 
 
For centuries the tools of national security matched the threat. Today the threats 
operate in a milieu that is transnational and not limited by the shell of nation-
state architecture. The foe moves in a world that is unrestricted by international 
convention, by physical borders, or the dictates of government. We must admit 
to ourselves the fact that our old division of labour it out-of-date and that we 
cannot justify the maintenance of hermetic seals between various agencies and 
forces. The successful members of the transatlantic community that won the 
                                                          
18 Unsuccessful because we now know that the intention of the attackers was to detonate their truck 
bomb next to a structural member within the WTC underground garage so that the building would 
collapse. Fortunately their bomb was of insufficient force to accomplish what would be 
accomplished through the use of the suicide jumbo-jet attack in 2001. 
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Cold War inherited a tool box of means to provide for security that has not 
changed. Whilst the enemy has moved to a higher operational plain of 
operational existence we have not and will likely never do so, since world 
governance is not something that is welcomed either by the majority of citizens 
who find their identity in the national métier, nor by the entrenched stratum of 
politicians who would have everything to loose should their domestic authority 
be replaced by a higher transnational one. As a result we must look elsewhere 
for a solution.  
 
If we recognize the fact that our internal national security and defense structures 
were inherited from another age and for another purpose, yet we are unable for 
various reasons (foremostly political) to create supranational solutions, then the 
only viable option it to radically reform the instruments at the nation-state level 
so as to make them more applicable to the new tasks at hands, to closer 
resemble the enemies of today and to heighten international cooperation in 
radical ways. If the internal barriers between the police force, the army and 
various intelligence services could be dismantled in a constitutionally 
guaranteed fashion, this would facilitate a modus operandi that is as flexible and 
as effective as that of our new enemies. There even exists a precedent for such a 
unified multi-agency approach19. Such a reform would result in 
“SuperPurple”20 structures being created that would be as flexible and hyper-
                                                          
19 In the bloodiest years of the PIRA’s campaign against the UK government, the decision was 
taken to create a radically new unit that would take the fight to the most dangerous players. 
Variously called, 14 Detachment, or Det., Dragon Company, or 14 Int. and Sy., this formation 
employed units made up of local police officers, members of the special forces (SAS / SBS) and 
the intelligence services. 14 Det. was very good at its job, overcoming the old divisions and 
obstacles to effective interagency cooperation. Whilst information on this part of the PIRA/UK 
struggle is limited, some works have in recent years shed light on 14 Det. See for example Martin 
Dillon: The Dirty War: covert strategies and tactics used in political conflicts, Routledge, New 
York, 1990 and James Rennie: “The Operators – on the streets with 14 Company”, Century, 
London, 1996.  
20 Purple operations and structures are those that involve all the arms of military service, army, 
navy, air force and marines, or systems that require their members to be crossed-trained and/or 
experienced in combined arms operations. The US Department of Defense has been emphasizing 
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mobile as the enemies they need to neutralize. It would not even be too far-
fetched to make the argument that in the case of many countries they would be 
best served in the current geostrategic environment by a unitary body which 
conglomerated all the skills of the various separate agencies and units into a 
new structure better suited to facing threats transcendental terrorist threat such 
as al Qaeda.  
 
Even so, the reality is that such a broad sweeping reform and restructuring of 
the national security apparatus of the nations of the developed West will 
inevitably run into heavy resistance from all those who have an interest in 
maintaining existing structures and who do not see the necessity for change. It 
is most likely the responsibility therefore of the non-governmental think-tank 
community to promote the initial discussion on how best to shape old 
capabilities to meet new threats and to convince as many members of the 
general public as possible that the topic should be placed on the political agenda 
of the various nations.  
 
Subsequently it is hoped that the policy elites will recognise the contribution 
political science categorizations and recommendations can have and will 
recognize that existing national security architectures must be refocused so as to 
be made able to function effectively across the international arena with the 
agencies of other countries. Only in this fashion will we are to be able to 
manage the transnational threat that is transcendentally-informed political 
violence.  
© S. L. v. Gorka 2007 
                                                                                                                                
the “Purple Mode” for some years now, breaking down the technical as well as mental barriers to 
interoperability amongst the services, ever since the Goldwater Nichols Act mandated inter-service 
postings for senior officers. The name purple allegedly comes from the colour arrived at if the four 
service colours are mixed. My proposal would take this approach and apply it across the whole 
palate of national security tools, not just the armed forces. I am indebted to my good friend Keith 
Mines of the US State Department for christening my concept so aptly.  
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APPENDIX I: LETHALITY OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, 1993-2003 
 
 
    YEAR           Number of attacks             Number of victims     Average 
 
1993 431 1510 3.5 
1994 322 988 3 
1995 440 6445 14.6 
1996 296 3224 10.8 
1997 304 915 3 
1998 274 6694 25.5 
1999 395 940 2.3 
2000 426 1212 2.8 
2001 355 5806 16.3 
2002 205 3072 14.9 
2003 208 4271 20.5 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Global Patterns of Terrorism, United States Department of 
State www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/33777.htm  
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html   
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APPENDIX II: GOVERNMENTAL DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM  
 
Terrorism is the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in 
fear. 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 
United Kingdom 
 
 
Terrorism is the enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are 
intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other 
persons, especially by means of severe crimes as detailed in Article 129a, 
Section 1 of the penal Code (above all: murder, homicide, extortionist 
kidnapping, arson, explosives detonation) or by means of other acts of violence 
which serve as preparation of such criminal acts 
Bundesamt für Vefassungsshutz,  
(Office for the Protection of the Constitution)  
Germany 
 
 
Terrorism is the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or 
groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to established governmental 
authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a large group 
wider than the immediate victims.” 
Central Intelligence Agency 
USA  
 
 
  
Terrorism is defined as the unlawful, or threatened use of force or violence by a 
group or individual committed against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives. 
Federal Bureau of Investigations 
USA 
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EXTERNAL REVIEW 
No. 1 Prof. Gy. Schöpflin 
 
SCHÖPFLIN GYÖRGY  
korábban Jean Monnet professzor 
University College London  
vendégprofesszor  
University of Bologna 
 
 
 
Bírálat Gorka Sebestyén 'Content and End - State-based Alteration in the 
Practice of Political Violence since the End of the Cold War - The Rise of 
the "Irrational Actor' cím• PhD dolgozatáról 
 
 
Az elemzés kiindulópontja a nemzetközi államrendszer 1989 utáni kialakulása 
és ezen belül a terrorizmus szerepe, amelyet a szerző "irrational actornak" 
nevez. Az elnevezésen lehet vitatkozni, amennyiben egy mélyebb elméleti 
megközelítést alkalmazunk: A hagyományos államközpontú elemzési 
rendszerből kiindulva a terrorizmus valóban irracionálisnak tűnik, mivel a 
politikai hatalom mozgását magába integrálja az állam és az államok által 
elfogadott nemzetközi intézmények hálózata. Ez az, ami 1989-ben meglazult, 
sőt egy sor államot tart számon a világ, amelyek képtelenek fenntartani a 
hagyományos max weberi kötelezettségeket, illetve képtelen ezen elvárásoknak 
eleget tenni, elsősorban az erőszak monopóliumával kapcsolatosakat.  
 
Ezt a változást a modernség kontra posztmodern kontrasztjával lehet 
megragadni. Bár a nagyon szilárd alapokon működő, nagyrészt nyugati 
nemzetállamokat is kikezdte az új folyamatok összessége - ezeket nevezzük 
globalizációnak - a nyugati állam, az eredeti nemzetállam bölcsője és 
fenntartója egyelőre elbírja, elviseli a ráhelyezkedő nyomást kisebb-nagyobb 
kihagyásokkal, amíg a nem nyugati állam, minőségileg más kulturális 
alapokból felépítve nem képes és valószínűleg soha nem is volt képes a Nyugat 
által rájuk szabott feladatokat ellátni. 
 
A hidegháború által kiváltott nyomás ezeket a gyengeségeket, elégtelenségeket 
elrejtette, láthatatlanná tette, de az 1989 óta létrejött változások nemcsak hogy 
észlelhetővé tették az új világ új politikai tényezőinek kibontakozását, hanem 
lehetőséget nyújtottak új politikai aktoroknak új szerepek vállalására. 
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A terrorizmus ebben a képződményben csak egy ilyen szereplő a sok közül, 
amelyek átalakítják a nemzetköziség rendszerét, az eddiginél jóval összetettebb 
irányba: Gondoljunk csak a multinacionális vállalatokra, a nemzetközi NGO-
kra az internetre és a világot magába foglaló televízió és egyéb médiára, 
valamint az ezt elősegítő angol nyelv terjedésére.  
 
Ebben a kontextusban a terrorizmus, illetve a terroristák semmiképpen nem 
irracionálisabbak a többinél, hanem saját felfogásuk után járva, a fővonal, a 
mainstream által létrehozott szabályrendszert támadják meg, élve a fent 
említett újonnan kialakult lehetőségekkel, kihasználva az új hatalmi 
fegyvereket.  
 
12. oldal "political violence". Visszatérve a max weberi megfogalmazásra az 
erőszak vagy annak rejtett formája mindig is részét képezi a hatalomnak, tehát 
a kifejezés "political violence" nem magától értetődik: Ebben az elméleti 
összefüggésben inkább a nem államilag legitimált erőszakról van szó, tehát 
szerencsésebb lenne "non-state-legitimated violence-ről" írni. Bár 
elfogadhatjuk az eredeti kifejezést, ha pontosabban van körülírva. 
Természetesen ennek a folyamatnak jóval tágabb a kontextusa "a nem állami 
aktorok" szaporodása egy központi fejleménye az 1989 utáni rendszernek.   
 
19. oldal "resurgence in terrorism that is not purely political in nature". Ez az 
állítás fontos elméleti kérdéseket vet fel, illetve magát a politika fogalmát 
hagyja meghatározatlanul, arról tanúskodik, hogy az értekezés az állam/nem-
állam dichotómiában gondolkodik, a nem-állami aktorok említésének ellenére. 
Az alapvető probléma a nem-állami aktorok racionalitásának megítélése: Ha 
elfogadjuk a racionalitás fogalmával járó bonyodalmakat, akkor esetleg egy 
többszintű és többformájú racionalitás fogalmával közelebb kerülünk a 
terrorizmus antológiájához. 
27. oldal A 17. lábjegyzet nagyon és félrevezetően leegyszerűsíti az Európai 
Unió és Törökország kapcsolatát.  
 
173-174. oldal A nem európai társadalmi szervezkedés kérdése és a 
nagycsalád, a klán szerepe messzemenően formálja az említett társadalmak 
politikai hatalomrendszerét, amelyről a nyugati demokráciaelméletek nemigen 
akarnak tudomást venni, pedig ennek megvan az antropológiai és szociológiai 
irodalma, például Edward Schatz "Modern Clan Politics" és az ott idézett 
írások.  
 
 
 
 
 
  32
 
Az eddigieket szem előtt tartva a három kritikai mércének véleményem szerint 
az értekezés eleget tesz: 
 
1. Az idevágó tudományos irodalom felhasználása széles és meggyőző. 
2. A módszertan koherens és logikus, jóllehet - és ezeket próbáltam vizsgálni a 
fentiekben - mélyebb episztemológiai szinten sok mást is ki lehetett volna 
hozni az elemzésből.  
3. Az értekezés sikeresen rámutatott az új helyzet ismérveire és ezzel eredeti 
meglátásokat fogalmazott meg.  
 
Minősítési javaslat: cum laude 
 
 
                       s.k. 
                        PROF. SCHÖPFLIN GYÖRGY  
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Prof. A. Ágh  
Doctoral School 
Political Science Department 
Corvinus University 
Budapest  
 
20 April 2006 
 
 
 
Re: Sebestyen Gorka, “Content and End-State, based Alteration in the 
Practice of the Political Violence since the End of the Cold War” 
 
In his Thesis, Mr Gorka has applied rigorous academic research and analysis to 
a very topical issue. He has, in consequence, produced a work not only of 
academic excellence, but also of significant current policy relevance. 
 
Throughout the work, Mr Gorka has demonstrated a very through knowledge 
and deep understanding of the issue of terrorism in all its complexity, set within 
its context of domestic situations and international relations. His through and 
very competent use of the available material – academic research, technical 
studies, political analysis – coupled with his understanding of the operational 
sphere, combined to provide a very firm basis for Mr Gorka’s work. 
 
On this firm basis of knowledge, Mr Gorka has proceeded to develop his 
analysis by means of a very innovative use of research methods and 
techniques. The combination of traditional academic rigour with a very clever 
use of sources and great insight into national and international processes has 
enabled Mr Gorka to go beyond the analysis normally found in such a thesis 
into an assessment of both the problems and there potential solutions. It is this 
which gives the Thesis its particular topicality and policy relevance, thereby 
raising it well above the normal level to be expected pf such a work, and 
insuring that it will make a special and unique contribution not only to a 
understanding of the issue but also of how and can it should be tackled. 
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The main issue for modern societies in today’s rapidly changing world is how to 
meet new security challenges in ways which do not compound the problems 
they bring with them. There efforts are made more difficult by the shortage of 
academic analysis of current socialite trends; a failure to appreciate the 
complexities and strength of the driving forces behind the new threats and 
challenges (such as fundamentalist terrorism); and the lack of operational 
experience and awareness. In his thesis Mr Gorka successfully addresses all 
these issues and also helps to point the way for future research work where in-
depth academic study can bring real benefit to policy formulation and 
implementation. 
 
It is for these reasons that I would congratulate Mr Gorka on producing an 
excellent dissertation. He has demonstrated that the traditional academic virtue 
can be extremely relevant to the solution of contemporary political and social 
problems. I have no hesitation in recommending his thesis for acceptance by 
his peers and the doctoral school. If I were to make one additional remark, it 
would be to have Mr. Gorka devote a small section of any further version of the 
text to a discussion of how his final policy recommendation – the use of “Super 
Purple” could be achieved political, given the various institutional interests it 
would challenge. 
 
I remain, yours faithfully 
 
Chris Donnelly CMG  
Head  
Advanced Research and Assessment Group 
UK Defence Academy 
Joint Services Command & Staff College 
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EXTERNAL REVIEW 
No. 3 Col. K. McGrath 
 
 
 
To: The Political Science Department 
Corvinus University  
Budapest  
 
 
I have read with great interest Sebestyén Gorka’s work, “Content and End-
State-based Alteration in the Practice of Political Violence since the End of the 
Cold War.”  I found it a very relevant and necessary exploration of the vexing 
problem now confronting many advanced states: namely how best to organize 
a nation’s capabilities to effectively protect its citizenry from the “hyper-
terrorist.”  Understandably, the speed and zeal with which nations combine 
their various institutions of governance (and their attendant structures) to 
counter this threat will have regional and global impact.     
 
Mr. Gorka presents a compelling argument for defining the “hyper-
terrorist” as an altogether new threat; one that challenges nations to develop 
innovative approaches to form new (or reform old) structures which will 
appropriately empower law enforcement, security, and military capacities to 
successfully counter this worrisome threat.   To debate the correct 
characterization of this threat appears a moot exercise.  What is undeniably 
real, at least from the view of several world capitals, is the absolute 
requirement to counter something so ominous that it defies traditional thought 
and approach.  The current structures have proven less than effective to this 
task.   To this end, Mr. Gorka’s claim that it is necessary “…to radically reform 
the nation-state level instruments so as to make them more applicable to…the 
enemies of today” is most fundamental.    
 
However, care must be exercised here.  If done abruptly, undoing 
traditional structures, processes and procedures may result in a less secure 
environment than had been aimed to achieve.  The traditional challenges of law 
enforcement have not diminished, rather they have transformed as much as 
modern economies have—becoming more global, connected and 
  36
technologically advanced.  In a like manner, security services continue their 
work against long-established foes and with well-established friends as 
necessary.  In the military sphere, troops are now called to answer the immense 
responsibilities of full spectrum conflict.  Radical reform of these and other 
structures invites risk.  Likely new structures come largely at the expense of 
old ones.  In transition from current to future, the assignment of tasks and 
necessary resources must move in concert.   In addition, balance has to be 
achieved between the limits a citizenry will render its government in the name 
of protecting them.  Being totally secure, at the cost of having far less personal 
privacy and/or freedom may be too costly a price many citizens are willing to 
pay for security --  especially in the absence of a clear and definable threat to 
them.  (A key concern, when there may not be universal agreement outside 
official circles that radical change is needed.)   
 
In general, academically derived solutions are thoughtfully developed 
and logic based.  However, this cannot be interpreted to mean that they are then 
politically feasible to implement.  Often the outcome of a well-intentioned 
political initiative is quite different than its original design.  This is a 
consequence of democracies—often less efficient and less decisive than other 
forms of governance.  Notwithstanding, progress is achievable.  A necessary 
precursor for meaningful change is for political leaders to articulate compelling 
arguments for that change, and subsequently to propose solutions that are 
executable.  As Mr. Gorka contends, independent think-tanks have an 
important role, if not the outright responsibility, to play in this process.  The 
think-tank community can be a significant, but not exclusive, catalyst of 
change here.  The expansive nature of tasks to be addressed to guard against 
the “hyper-terrorist” must include perspective from a broad field of 
stakeholders.  Much work is needed to adapt current constructs of national 
security to confront new realities.  Without question, Mr. Gorka’s work moves 
to the discussion forward.   
 
Col. Kevin P. McGrath 
       Defense Attaché 
US Embassy 
Budapest 7 April 2006 
 
 
